Abstract
12 1. Introduction
13
The concept of a Turing machine is a formal, abstract, concept that arises out of a basic idea: any comput-14 ing device should be able to calculate a (computable) function by splitting it into small operational ''bricks,'' 15 or elementary operations, whose manifold combinations would then give us all possible computable functions. 16 Turing machines [18] are usually introduced via their tables, that specify elementary operations like moving 17 the head to the left or to the right, erasing or printing a symbol on the tapeÕs square under the head, and so on. 18 However it is more convenient for us to give an alternative definition for the concept in this paper, and we will 19 use the (fully equivalent) partial recursive function picture to stress that we are dealing with a formal 20 construction. 21 Let p U (k, x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) be an universal Diophantine polynomial [8, 21] which we suppose to be fixed. We 22 define the partial recursive function {e} of Gö del number e that acts on natural number m as its input and has 23 natural number n as its output as 24 Definition 1.1 ½fegðmÞ ¼ n $ Def ½9x 0 ; . . . ; x k 2 xp U ðhe; m; ni; x 0 ; x 1 ; . . . ; x k Þ ¼ 0.
27
(x is the set of natural numbers, hx, y, zi = hx, hy, zii and hÁ Á Ái is the usual pairing function; for the compu-28 tation of e and the construction of p U see [8, 21, 18] .)
29
Partial recursive function {e} is given by the preceding definition. Of course there is a relation between (the 30 abstract objects) Turing machines and concrete objects of our real world such as computers (which can be best
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31 seen as realizations of finite automata) but we restrict our attention to the mathematical object characterized 32 above. 33 We can also put I e ¼ fn 2 x: for some m 2 x; n ¼ fegðmÞg.
36
The I e are the recursively enumerable sets. Clearly for all e, I e & x. As there is only a countably infinity of 37 such I e , we may consider sets E so that E 6 2 {I e : e 2 x}. 38 1.1. Exploring extensions
39
Can we extend those ideas? Say: let us define some set of functions f j ; j 2 I, from x to x, where I is some 40 indexing set. Can we find a set of reasonably intuitive, more involved, elementary operations, so that each f j 41 splits up into those elementary operations? Besides the trivial answer (take the f j as the ''bricks'' one is looking 42 for, the question we ask here is in fact-can we usefully generalize the concept of computability? 43 We must restrict our quest, as the above question is too general. We may for instance just consider arith-44 metical subsets of the natural numbers [18] . 45 Our characterization of the recursively enumerable sets I e uses a polynomial over the natural numbers, that 46 is, sums and products of natural numbers. What happens if we allow for series? What happens if we somehow 47 extend our admissible operations to encompass a few simple real-defined and real-valued functions such as 48 again polynomials, sines, exponentials? If we allow for operations like the positive value jxj of x, derivatives 49 or integrals? 50
More precisely 51 Which is the class of the sets E j given by n 2 E j M $m(n = f j (m), where f j is explicitly given by an expression 52 with real-valued and real-defined polynomials, sines, exponentials, j. . .j, plus infinite sums, derivatives an inte-53 grals-that is, operations to be found in the toolbox of classical elementary analysis?
54
That class includes, as we will see, explicit expressions within the language of classical elementary analysis 55 for characteristic functions of subsets of x in the complete arithmetic degrees 0, 0 0 , 0 00 , . . ..
56
Now we may ask a further question: is there a physical, real-world device that would actually compute those 57 characteristic functions? Scarpellini [19, 20] wondered about its realizability some 40 years ago. Of course we 58 will probably never be able to fully make a concrete counterpart of the ideal objects we will discuss in the next 59 section, as much as we cannot fully realize in the concrete world a counterpart of a general Turing machine, 60 with its potentially unbounded memory. 61
Yet a question remains: how far can we go in the concrete realizations of the formal hypercomputing 62 objects we introduce here? 63 2. Expressions for the Halting Function and beyond
64
The present section follows published results by the authors [3,4,6,7].
65 2.1. An informal discussion
66
We start from a very informal discussion; one must always keep in mind that it is here given as a rather naï 67 ve but nevertheless suggestive, starting point.
68 Remark 2.1. Go to the blackboard; pick up a piece of chalk, draw a circle on the blackboard. Then mark a 69 point within the circle, and another one outside it. Join both by a continuous line. You will immediately see 70 that this line crosses the circle. This is the intuition behind the Jordan Curve Theorem, a notoriously tricky 71 theorem when we have to prove it. 72
Place your 6-month old child (or grandchild. . .) within a childÕs playpen. After a few minutes he or she will 73 get bored and start crying, asking to be taken out of the pen, whose boundaries restrain the babyÕs movements. 74 So, the essential content of the Jordan Curve Theorem-shall we say intuitively? naïvely?-appears to be 75 known even to a baby, while again very few adults can fathom its proof.
Take elementary Euclidean plane geometry, and consider two open-ended line segments within a given 77 square. Can we check whether the two segments do intersect? That again appears to be a trivial question-but 78 the corresponding mathematical problem is (in a sense made precise below) algorithmically unsolvable: 79 namely, given the equations for a straight line and for a curve described by elementary functions with rational 80 coefficients and p, we cannot decide in general whether the curve and the straight line do intersect. A simple 81 map then transfers that result to the interior of a square.
82
Those examples suggest, in a naïve way, that perhaps our brain operates with nonrecursive processes. If 83 that is the case, hypercomputation theories are not just abstract exercises. 84 2.2. A Turing machine with an analog oracle
85
We will consider in this section an ideal device composed of 86 • A Turing machine with an oracle. 87 • The oracle is an analog oracle that decides, given two smooth curve segments without endpoints (homeo-88
morphic to an open segment) within a square on the plane, whether they have a common point. 89 90
The oracle above described amounts as we will see to an ideal device that settles the Halting Function. We 91 will elaborate on that assertion. The key idea is, there are infinitely many expressions for the Halting Function, 92 the function that settles the Halting Problem, within some simple formal languages that extend arithmetic. 93 (For a review of our results with full references see [6] . The whole constructions will appear in [7] .) 94 We have to move to a rather technical presentation now. 
107
Let x be the set of natural numbers, as above, and let A be the real-defined and real-valued algebra of 108 polynomials, trigonometric functions, and exponentials, closed under sum, product and function composition; 109 we add to A the number p and close.
110 Proposition 2.4 (RichardsonÕs Map, I). There is an injection j P : P ! A, where P denotes the algebra of 111 x-defined and x-valued polynomials in a finite number of variables, and A is the algebra of functions described 112 above, such that: 113 1. j P is constructive, that is, given the expression for p in arithmetic, there is an effective procedure so that we can 114 obtain the corresponding expression for F = j P (p) in A. 115 2. j P is 1-1.
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116 3. Forx ¼ ðx 1 ; . . . ; x n Þ, 9x 2 x n pðm;xÞ ¼ 0 if and only if 9x 2 R n F ðm;xÞ ¼ 0 if and only if 9x 2 R n F ðm;xÞ 6 1, 117 for p 2 P and F 2 A. 118 4. The injection j P is proper. 119
120
The crucial property is given in step 3.: it allows us to translate the existence of roots for Diophantine equa-121 tions into roots of the corresponding transformed real-defined and real-valued function, with some extras. 122 Notice that this construction can be fully formalized within Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF (with or without 123 the Axiom of Choice); ZFC is the full set theory plus the Axiom of Choice.
124 Remark 2.5. The map from Diophantine polynomials into the algebra of elementary real-valued and real-125 defined functions is given by the following construction. Given
128 where p(m, x 1 , . . .) is a Diophantine polynomial and (for p extended over the reals); k i satisfies
131 with jD i j 6 1; an expression for k i can be explicitly constructed-see the references. Then put
n Þ 134 and we have our desired j P transform. 135 2.5. RichardsonÕs map: one-dimensional version
136
We can obtain a one-dimensional version of the preceding results. Here we only sketch the main ideas, leav-137 ing the details for the references.
138 Remark 2.6. We define:
141 Given F(m, x 1 , . . . , x n ), we make the following substitutions:
. Here g is composed n À 2 times. And 147
. Here g is composed n times. 160 Remark 2.8. The preceding theorem implies the claim made at the opening of this section: given two smooth 161 curves on the plane, there is no general algorithm to decide whether they cross or not; a compactification that 162 maps those curves within the interior of a square leads to our claim-there is no general algorithm to check 163 whether any two curve segments without endpoints within a square on the plane do cross or not. 164
175
Since the Halting Problem is not algorithmically solvable, we know that h is not a Turing-computable func-176 tion. The idea is to obtain an explicit expression for h in the language of classical analysis. 177
Then, if r is the sign function, r(±x) = ±1 and r(0) = 0.
178 Proposition 2.10 (The Halting Function). The Halting Function h(n, q) is explicitly given by hðn; qÞ ¼ rðG n;q Þ;
C n;q ðxÞe Àx 2 dx; C m;q ðxÞ ¼ jF m;q ðxÞ À 1j À ðF m;q ðxÞ À 1Þ. F n;q ðxÞ ¼ j P p n;q .
181 Here p n,q is the two-parameter universal Diophantine polynomial pðhn; qi; x 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x r Þ 184 and j P is as in Proposition 2.4.
185 Remark 2.11. Notice that there is also an expression for the Halting Function within a theory that includes 186 arithmetic plus some definition for infinite series. Let p(n, x) be a one-parameter universal polynomial; x 187 abbreviates x 1 , . . . , x p . Then either p 2 (n, x) P 1, for all x 2 x p , or there are x in x p such that p 2 (n, x) = 0 188 sometimes. As r(x) when restricted to x is primitive recursive, we may define a function w(n, x) = 1 À rp 2 (n, x) 189 such that The infinite sum makes the difference. 
204
T may be, say, ZFC (or adequate extensions), or a fragment of it that includes the main tools of classical 205 elementary analysis. Let P(x) be a one-variable formula in the language of T so that there are adequately 206 defined terms h, h 0 , defined for example by using the description symbol, with T ' P(h) and T ' :P ðh 0 Þ. Then 207 Proposition 2.13. If T is arithmetically sound, then 208 1. There is a term h so that neither T 0:P ðhÞ nor T 0 P(h), but N P(h), where N makes T arithmetically sound. 209 2. There is an infinite denumerable set of defined terms h m , m 2 x, such that there is no general decision procedure 210 to ascertain, for an arbitrary m, whether P(h m ) or :P ðh m Þ is provable in T. From what we have presented here, it is easily seen that our infor-223 mal assertion made at the beginning of this section, that an oracle that settles whether given two smooth 224 curves with open endpoints on the plane, they have a common point, also settles something that cannot be 225 algorithmically decided within the language of classical analysis. Even a simple question like-does an equa-226 tion f(x) = 0 built out of elementary functions have roots?-is algorithmically unsolvable. 227 2.9. A conjecture
228
The idea implicit in the preceding results is: can we use elementary functions in classical analysis as building 229 bricks for an useful, implementable, extended computation theory? We therefore formulate the following 230 admittedly risky conjecture:
231 Every mathematical operation up to the level of elementary calculus can be ''usefully'' implemented and 232 computed by some computing device, at least in an approximate way.
233
(The assumption that lies in the background of the conjecture is: mathematics somehow mirrors what goes 234 on in the world, and therefore mathematical procedures can be simulated by some concrete process. The gist 235 of our conjecture is: how close to truly useful can we get our ''useful''?) 236 If that holds, we are done. This idea is an old one; to our knowledge it goes back to Scarpellini in 1962 237 [19, 20] , and has been explored in several ways (cf. [14]) before our 1990 work (published in 1991 [2,22]). 238 Can it ever be implemented? The whole point has to do with the imprecisions of analog computers-but any-239 way when we see two lines on the blackboard, we immediately see whether they cross or not. Is that a pointer 240 towards the feasibility of our oracle? 241 We may of course weaken it and say
Every mathematical operation up to the level of elementary calculus can be physically implemented in an approximate but useful way and computed by some computing device in order to give some nontrivial information. 
The qualifications weaken it and make it more plausible. Say, how about the physical implementation of an 246 analog device that computes instances of h(m) up to some finite but large m? For we are only interested (in 247 practical situations) with finite, even if large, specific instances of the halting problem. 248
In order to get an affirmative answer for the Halting Problem-M m (n) halts-one only needs a computation 249 that performs a finite number of steps. Would an actual, concrete, analog oracle be able to give us the negative 250 answers? 251 3. Further remarks
252
There is a well-known relation between undecidability and incompleteness. The Davis [8] version of Gö delÕs 253 first incompleteness theorem (out of an idea that goes back to Post in 1944) proves that theorem out of the 254 nonexistence of an algorithm to settle HilbertÕs 10th Problem. Can we turn the tables, and look at undecid-255 ability from the viewpoint of incompleteness? 256
Let us consider the following question: can we algorithmically check whether the usual formal sentence 257 Consis(PA) that asserts the consistency of Peano Arithmetic is true? Of course that cannot be done within 258 Peano Arithmetic itself. However consider the following question:
Suppose that we give, for each natural number n, a finite set S n . Suppose that, again for each n, we hand out an algorithm to compute the elements of S n . Consider the function F(n) = maxS n + 1. Is it a total function? Can we compute it, for an arbitrary value?
262
Most mathematicians would say that, once we have a recipe for the computation of any S n , then we can 263 compute its maximum value, and add one and get a value for F(n). Is that so, always? (On this discussion 264 see [16] .) 265
As it is well known, the function usually noted F 0 cannot be proved to be total within Peano Arithmetic, 266 even if it is naïvely and intuitively total, and can be given an explicit algorithm (it is of very large computa-267 tional complexity). The theory PA þ ½F 0 is total is very strong, as it proves Consis(PA). 268
There is a beautiful algorithmic implementation of a related computation by Kunen [15] . Kunen uses prim-269 itive recursive arithmetic (but for a single step) to build a program that proves the Paris-Harrington theorem. 270 His construction is clear cut, and we can actually see where is the step that corresponds to GentzenÕs transfinite 271 induction, a step that can be informally implemented in KunenÕs algorithm for the proof of Paris-Harrington, 272 but which does not fit within Peano Arithmetic (please see the reference for details). Kunen notices in his paper 273 [15] that one could in fact extend his algorithm to one that proves Consis(PA). 
275
Can we generalize that construction? One possible, even if controversial, road to follow would be some-276 thing like the Turing-Feferman theorem. Notice that each failed instance-negative answer-of the Halting 277 Problem can be formalized as a P 1 sentence: there is a Diophantine polynomial p so that, given partial recur-278 sive function {m} and input n, {m}(n) is undefined (does not halt, in the Turing machine picture) if and only if 8x 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x k pðhm; ni; x 1 ; . . . ; x k Þ > 0 281 is true of the standard integers. 282
The present discussion is informal and sketchy. However we believe that it gives an idea of the subject 283 matter. 284
The Turing-Feferman theorem is an old conundrum (for references and a summary see [1,12,13]). There are 285 several technical difficulties and subtleties to be considered, but, roughly, the idea of the theorem (in TuringÕs 286 version) is that there is a sequence of theories that include PA ([13, p. 381]),
289 (Here, T 1 = T 0 + Consis(T 0 ), and in general T j+1 = T j + Consis(T j ), where Consis(T j ) is the usual sentence 290 that asserts the consistency of theory T j )-so that for some k, T k proves a given P 1 sentence /. Therefore, 291 with some machinery we can show that all instances of the Halting Problem, each one given by a P 1 sentence,
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292 will be decided within that sequence of theories by some specific T k ; see [1] . (Actually, PA itself proves infi-293 nitely many P 1 sentences which correspond to instances of the Halting Problem.) 294
For the sake of progressions as above we will just replace PA for T.
295
The question is: can we turn this result into some reasonable procedure, that will end up by deciding each 296 particular instance of the Halting Problem, even if the full procedure has a possibly unbounded computational 297 complexity? We ask that question in the light of the following example. 298
Let us for a moment go back to theories T which include arithmetic, have a recursively enumerable set of 299 theorems, and are arithmetically sound; for the formal definition of R 1 -soundness as a reflection principle in 300 the sense of Feferman see [1,12,13]. Then 301 Definition 3.1. A bounding total recursive function F T over T is a recursive function which is diagonal over all 302 T-provably total recursive functions.
303
The following results are well-known [1]: 
319
Put T 0 as PA, Peano Arithmetic. Suppose that we are satisfied that PA is consistent-actually, it is enough 320 to naïvely check KunenÕs [15] algorithm for Paris-Harrington, and deduce Consis(PA). Follows the consis-321 tency of any finite segment of that sequence. 322
In order to decide a particular negative instance of the Halting Problem, say, is {m}(n) undefined?-one 323 must go up in that sequence just a finite number of steps. Can we algorithmically deal with it, even if only 324 in an informal way, through some informal procedure? 325
A reasonable kind of (extra, hyper) computational procedure can perhaps be implemented if we get an affir-326 mative answer to the following question:
327 Can we construct a recursively enumerable sequence T of strictly increasing total recursive functions so 328 that, given any strictly increasing total recursive function G there is a function F j in the sequence so that 329 F j dominates G?
330
Given some theory T 0 j in the sequence T 0 0 ; T 0 1 ; . . . ; T j ; . . . ; 333 there will always be some function F j 2 T so that F j dominates all provably total recursive functions in 334 T 0 j þ ½T 0 j is R 1 -sound. Therefore T 0 j þ ½F j is total proves Consis(T j ) and will therefore prove all P 1 sentences 335 that are proved by T j+1 = T j + Consis(T j ), including specific instances of the Halting Problem. 336 We can wonder whether one could use them to implement some kind of hypercomputational procedure.
337 Remark 3.3. We wish to stress the following point: the present discussion cannot be formalized within any 338 theory T as characterized above: one that is consistent, includes PA, is arithmetically sound, and has a 339 recursively enumerable set of theorems, since there is a bound to the growth speed of total recursive functions 340 in those theories [1, 5] . The same is true even if we substitute ZFC, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory plus the 341 Axiom of Choice, for PA.
